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Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to 
maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token 
first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more 
recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-
person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains 
that such a guarantee is explained by a fairly flatfooted interpretation of the thinker-reflexive 
rule. I argue, however, that the explanatory aspirations of the thinker-reflexive rule are 
fulfilled only if we accept an epistemically loaded gloss on the notion of a thinker of a 
thought featuring the rule. That gloss is unpacked in terms of the subject’s ability to be 
acquainted with the phenomenal character of their thoughts. 
 
Several philosophers in the analytic tradition have maintained that the first-person 
indexical ‘I’ possesses some special property that is not possessed by any other 
singular concept.1 However, the lack of consensus on both what such a property is 
																																																								
1 This position is traditionally credited to Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe, “The First Person,” 
in Samuel D. Guttenplan, ed., Mind and Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 45-65; Carol 
Rovane, “The Epistemology of First-Person Reference,” this JOURNAL, LXXXIV, 3(March 1987): 147-
67; “Self-Reference: The Radicalization of Locke,” this JOURNAL, XC, 2 (February 1993): 73-97; 
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and why it is that only ‘I’ has it,2 together with the uprising of a sceptical movement 
about the distinctive significance of mental indexicality,3 cast a shadow over the 
fruitfulness of contemporary debates on the first person. In a recent article,4 Santiago 
Echeverri admirably takes on the twofold task of precisely identifying a candidate 
special property and explaining why the first-person concept possesses it. Expanding 
on a proposal originally made by Annalisa Coliva,5 Echeverri maintains that what’s 
distinctive about ‘I’ is that if I raised questions about its reference while thinking a 
first-person thought I would both be incoherent and use ‘I’ incompetently. Echeverri 
calls this feature GUARANTEE and proposes to explain it via the idea that the first-
																																																																																																																																																														
Sydney Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” this JOURNAL, LXV, 19 (October 1968): 
555-67; Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper and Row 1958). Note 
that while Anscombe, Shoemaker and Wittgenstein focused on the first-person pronoun in language, I 
will follow the current literature and focus on the first-person concept. 
2 See for instance Annalisa Coliva, “The First Person: Error through Misidentification, the Split 
between Speaker’s and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee,” this JOURNAL, C, 8 (August 
2003): 416-31; “Error Through Misidentification: Some Varieties”, this JOURNAL, CVII, 8 (August 
2006): 403-25; Aidan McGlynn, “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology 
of De Se Thought,” in Manuel García-Carpintero and Stephan Torre, eds., About Oneself (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2016), pp. 25-55; Simon Prosser and François Recanati, eds., Immunity to 
Error through Misidentification: New Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
3 See for instance Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever, The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical 
Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Ofra 
Magidor, “The Myth of the De Se,” Philosophical Perspectives, XXIX, 1 (December 2015): 249-83; 
Ruth Garrett Millikan, “The Myth of the Essential Indexical,” Noûs, XXIV, 5 (December 1990): 723-34. 
4 Santiago Echeverri, “Guarantee and Reflexivity,” this JOURNAL, CXVII, 9 (September 2020): 473-500. 
5 See Coliva “The First Person: Error through Misidentification, the Split between Speaker’s and 
Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee,” op. cit., p. 429. 
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person concept obeys a reflexive rule of reference to the effect that any token first-
person thought is about the thinker of that thought.6 
In my opinion, Echeverri makes a convincing case for GUARANTEE and 
succeeds at dispelling a number of worries about the reflexive rule. Despite this, I 
shall argue Echeverri is mistaken to think that a fairly flatfooted interpretation of the 
rule explains GUARANTEE. The correct explanation, I shall contend, appeals to a 
specific gloss on the notion of a thinker of a thought featuring the reflexive rule which 
ultimately commits us to an epistemically loaded account of how the rule fixes the 
reference of ‘I’. 
  
I Explaining GUARANTEE: Unsuccessful Rule Accounts 
 
In this section I first spell out GUARANTEE and I then argue that two versions of the 
reflexive rule for ‘I’ fail to explain it. 
I.1. Guarantee and the Bare Rule Account. Echeverri defines GUARANTEE as 
follows:7 
 
A thought, T, has GUARANTEE if and only if: 
																																																								
6 The reflexive rule for ‘I’ is endorsed, amongst others, by John Campbell, “Schizophrenia, the Space 
of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process,” The Monist, LXXXII, 4 (October 1999): 609-25, p. 623; 
Manuel García-Carpintero, “De Se Thoughts and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification,” 
Synthese, CXCV, 8 (August 2018): 3311-33, p. 3324; Lucy O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 78; and Christopher Peacocke, Truly Understood (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 81; The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-
Consciousness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 83. 
7 Ibid., p. 478. 
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(1) T has a token of a concept-type, C, that is de jure reflexive. 
(2) A thinker of T cannot (coherently) raise questions of reference relative 
to C while having T. 
 
To unpack clause (1), Echeverri defines de jure reflexivity as follows: “A concept C 
is de jure reflexive just in case, if a thinker S produces a token of C, the referent of 
that token is C”.8 To illustrate this definition, let us use Echeverri’s own example and 
consider the difference between Oedipus’s thoughts ‘The solver of the Sphinx’s riddle 
killed Laius’ and ‘I killed Laius’.9 While both ‘The solver of the Sphinx’s riddle’ and 
‘I’ refer to Oedipus, they do so differently: ‘The solver of the Sphinx’s riddle’ refers 
to Oedipus in virtue of the fact that Oedipus satisfies the description being the solver 
of the Sphinx’s riddle, whereas ‘I’ refers to Oedipus in virtue of the fact that Oedipus 
is the thinker of that token of ‘I’. To capture this difference, we say that ‘The solver of 
the Sphinx’s riddle’ is de facto reflexive whereas ‘I’ is de jure reflexive. Clause (2) of 
GUARANTEE receives both a normative and a constitutive interpretation:10 assuming 
that Oedipus doesn’t know that he is the solver of the Sphinx’s riddle, he can think 
‘The solver of the Sphinx’s riddle killed Laius’ while, at the same time, asking Does 
‘The solver of the Sphinx’s riddle’ refer to me?, without betraying any irrationality or 
conceptual deficiency. By contrast, if Oedipus thought ‘I killed Laius’ while, at the 
same time, wondering Does ‘I’ refer to me?, we would immediately question his 
rationality and conceptual competence with the first-person concept. 
																																																								
8 Ibid., p. 476. 
9 Ibid., p. 473. 
10 Ibid., p. 477. 
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Echeverri’s explanation of GUARANTEE is encapsulated in the following 
biconditional:11 
 
BARE RULE ACCOUNT: A thought, T, has GUARANTEE if and only if T contains a token 
of a concept-type that is governed by a bare reflexive rule to the effect that a token of 
I in a thinking stands for the thinker of that thinking. 
 
The right-to-left side of the biconditional is meant to have explanatory priority: so, I 
cannot coherently and competently ask what ‘I’ refers to while also thinking a first-
person thought because, given the reflexive rule, any token of ‘I’ refers to the thinker 
of that token of ‘I’. 
Before going on, let me clarify that the “bare” qualification is my own, and I 
use it to stress that the reflexive rule proposed by Echeverri doesn’t contain a specific 
gloss on the notion of a thinker (or a subject) of a thought.12 So, BARE RULE 
ACCOUNT purports to explain GUARANTEE without committing us to a specific 
conception of subjecthood. Prima facie, this is a good feature of BARE RULE 
ACCOUNT: the less an explanation of a phenomenon requires taking a stand on a 
controversial matter, the better. Relatedly, a second alleged advantage of BARE RULE 
ACCOUNT, one that is emphasised by Echeverri,13 is that it avoids commitment to 
epistemically loaded principles of reference determination. By so doing, BARE RULE 
ACCOUNT promises to offer a less controversial explanation of GUARANTEE than some 
																																																								
11 Echeverri, “Guarantee and Reflexivity,” op. cit., p. 480. 
12 While I take the notions of “subject” and “thinker” as synonymous here, at some points it will be 
more natural to use one term rather than the other. 
13 Ibid., p. 487 fn. 23. 
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of its competitors, chief amongst them the SELF-ACQUAINTANCE ACCOUNT to the 
effect that GUARANTEE holds since whenever we think a first-person thought we are 
acquainted with ourselves.14 I shall argue, however, that Echeverri is mistaken on 
both counts: a reflexive rule account of GUARANTEE does require a specific gloss on 
the notion of a thinker of a thought, a gloss which ultimately leads to an epistemically 
loaded account of how the rule fixes the reference of the first-person concept. 
I.2. Disowned first-person thoughts and the failure of BARE RULE ACCOUNT. 
Echeverri correctly observes that a crucial test case for an explanation of GUARANTEE 
comes from the possibility of disowned first-person thoughts.15 This possibility is best 
illustrated via reports of thought insertion made by schizophrenic subjects. Consider 
the following: 
 
I look out of the window and I think the garden looks nice and the grass 
looks cool, but the thoughts of Eamonn Andrews come into my mind. 
There are no other thoughts there, only his… He treats my mind like a 
screen and flashes his thoughts on to it like you flash a picture.16 
 
To make sense of reports like this, several philosophers have adopted John 
																																																								
14 Echeverri – Ibid., p. 487 fn. 23  –  cites, amongst others, Coliva, “The First Person: Error through 
Misidentification, the Split between Speaker’s and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee,” op. 
cit., p. 430;  Saul A. Kripke, “The First Person,” in Philosophical Troubles, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), pp. 292–321, p. 301. 
15Echeverri, “Guarantee and Reflexivity,” op. cit., §V. 
16 This report is contained in C. S. Mellor, “First Rank Symptoms of Schizophrenia,” The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, CXVII, 536 (July 1970): 15-23, here p. 17. 
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Campbell’s distinction between two notions of a thinker of a thought T: 17 the thinker 
qua “agent” and the thinker qua “recipient” of T. In order to count as the agent-
thinker of T, the thought “must have been generated by me”, 18 that is, the existence of 
T is explainable fully by the activity and cognitive powers of my own mind. In order 
to count as the recipient-thinker of a thought, by contrast, what matters is “the 
possibility of self-ascription of it by me”,19 that is, the fact that I can self-ascribe T in 
a distinctively direct and non-observational way.20  Campbell uses this distinction to 
maintain that a deluded S genuinely self-ascribes recipient-thinking T while, at the 
same time, denying agent-thinking it. Hence, the report I quoted above can be spelled 
out as follows: ‘I am recipient-thinking that the garden looks nice but Eamonn 
Andrews is agent-thinking it’. This kind of paraphrase makes thought insertion 
reports rationally intelligible and non-contradictory, despite being false. 
Thought insertion reports seem to suggest the following possibility: S, despite 
being deluded, competently uses the first-person indexical to coherently question 
whether it is them who are thinking a first-person thought. If so, S would be using ‘I’ 
in accordance with the bare reflexive rule even though the thought would not have 
																																																								
17 John Campbell, “Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process,” op. cit.; 
“The Ownership of Thoughts,” Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, IX, 1 (March 2002): 35-39. 
Other authors who endorse a broadly Campbellian model are Shaun Gallagher, “Self-Reference and 
Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification,” in Dan Zahavi, 
ed., Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience 
(Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2000), pp. 203–39; G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham, When Self- 
Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); and 
Peacocke, Truly Understood, op. cit., §7.8. 
18 Campbell, “The Ownership of Thoughts,” op. cit., p. 36. 
19 Ibid., p. 35. 
20 Ibid. 
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GUARANTEE, contra what BARE RULE ACCOUNT says. 
Echeverri offers two considerations against this type of counterexamples to 
BARE RULE ACCOUNT.21 First, a deluded S cannot really have genuine disowned first-
person thoughts; secondly, S can have genuine disowned first-person thoughts but 
those thoughts still possess GUARANTEE. Dialectically, it would be stronger to hold a 
reference rule that is not hostage to the outcome of the debate about whether thought 
insertion cases give us a reason to accept that there can be disowned first-person 
thoughts. 22  Thus, in the following, I will propose a reference rule that can 
accommodate the possibility of disowned first-person thoughts. 23 
																																																								
21 Echeverri, “Guarantee and Reflexivity,” op. cit., §5. 
22 See, for instance, the exchange between Campbell and Coliva. Campbell, “Schizophrenia, the Space 
of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process,” op. cit.; “The Ownership of Thoughts,” op. cit.; 
Annalisa Coliva, “Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology, IX, 1 (March 2002): 27–34; “On What There Really Is to Our Notion of 
Ownership of a Thought,” Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry IX, 1 (March 2002): 41-6. 
23 Campbell, “Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process,” op. cit., p. 621; 
Peacocke, Truly Understood, op. cit., pp. 89-90, maintain that a deluded counterpart of Oedipus could 
report the following: “I am aware of the thought ‘I killed Laius’ passing through my mind but it is not 
me who is thinking it”. This report would then be made rationally intelligible by spelling it out as 
follows: “I am recipient-thinking ‘I killed Laius’ but it is not me who is agent-thinking it”. As 
Echeverri notes – “Guarantee and Reflexivity,” op. cit., p. 496 – Peacocke’s discussion of disowned 
first-person thoughts is in tension with a rule account of GUARANTEE. Campbell clearly took disowned 
first-person thoughts to show that ‘I’ doesn’t possess any special epistemic property, but Campbell has 
in mind here immunity to error through misidentification and not GUARANTEE. This is important, since 
certain first-person thoughts can be vulnerable to error through misidentification and yet exhibit 
GUARANTEE, something which was first noted in Coliva, “The First Person: Error through 
Misidentification, the Split between Speaker’s and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee,” op. 
cit., p. 429. To illustrate. It is widely acknowledged that one’s judgement ‘a is F’ is immune to error 
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To vindicate the contention that disowned first-person thoughts possess 
GUARANTEE, Echeverri reasons as follows:24 a deluded S lacks action-awareness of 
their first-person thought T and, in this sense, they disown being the agent of T.25 
However, this does not bring S to question whether it is them who are thinking T. In 
reporting T the way they do, S does not question that they’re bearing a thinking 
relation to T; they rather question that they are the agent of the token T they are 
presently thinking. 
The foregoing gives us reason to think that disowned first-person thoughts 
possess GUARANTEE. However, BARE RULE ACCOUNT cannot explain why this is so. 
To see why, let us begin with the following idea: the reflexive rule of reference for ‘I’ 
not only describes its pattern of reference, but it also explains why ‘I’ refers to what it 
																																																																																																																																																														
through misidentification relative to the concept ‘a’ only if one’s judgement is made on certain 
grounds. (See for instance Coliva, “Error Through Misidentification: Some Varieties”, op. cit., pp. 410-
11; Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 218-9; James Pryor, 
“Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” Philosophical Topics, XXVI, 1/2 (Spring and Fall 
1999): 271-304, pp. 274, 282; Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” op. cit., p. 557.) As a 
consequence, immunity to error through misidentification is a ground-relative property, whereas 
GUARANTEE is not. Suppose now, to use one of Coliva’s examples (see Annalisa Coliva, “Stopping 
Points: ‘I’, Immunity and the Real Guarantee,” Inquiry, LX, 3 (Spring 2017): 233-52, p. 238), that I 
judge ‘My hair is blowing in the wind’ by looking at a glass mirror: it may well be the case that I am 
misidentifying someone else’s hair with mine, but it would not make sense to ask whether it is me who 
is making that very judgement. So, even if Campbell were right about disowned first-person thoughts 
and immunity to error through misidentification, this would not ipso facto show that disowned first-
person thoughts do not exhibit GUARANTEE. I am thankful to an anonymous referee for this JOURNAL 
for their help here. 
24 Echeverri, “Guarantee and Reflexivity,” op. cit., pp. 497-8. 
25 Echeverri draws here on Peacocke, Truly Understood, op. cit., p. 276. 
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refers to. This is tantamount to saying that the reflexive rule plays a type-
individuating role. According to a prominent approach championed by Christopher 
Peacocke,26 this means that the reflexive rule underwrites the canonical patterns of 
use of the concept – to be specified in terms of suitable primitive introduction and 
elimination rules – that one must have an implicit grasp of and be disposed to follow 
in order to count as possessing the concept and be a competent user of it. 
Crucially, if the reflexive rule type-individuates the first-person concept, it 
cannot be bare. The possibility of disowned first-person thoughts ensures that S can 
coherently assent to ‘I am recipient-thinking T’ while dissenting to ‘I am agent-
thinking T’ even though, as a matter of fact, the agent and the recipient of the thought 
is the same, that is, S. By Frege’s criterion of distinctness of concepts,27 this shows 
that the concept AGENT-THINKER and the concept RECIPIENT-THINKER are distinct even 
if, with respect to given a context c, they pick out the same entity in all possible 
worlds. So, the distinction between AGENT-THINKER and RECIPIENT-THINKER does 
make a hyperintensional difference, namely the kind of difference that generates 
different answers to the question of why ‘I’ refers to what it refers to. Thus, the 
																																																								
26 See for instance Christopher Peacocke, A Study of Concepts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); 
Truly Understood, op. cit.; The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness, 
op. cit. 
27 I formulate Frege’s criterion as follows: If a rationally intelligible subject S believes x to be F and 
also believes x not to be G, where F=G, then there are distinct concepts C and C*, such that S believes x 
to be F under C and disbelieves x to be G under C*. This slightly revises one of the best-known 
formulations of the criterion due to Stephen Schiffer, “The Basis of Reference,” Erkenntnis, XIII 
(January 1978): 171-206, p. 180. Let me stress that Frege’s criterion is compatible with Echeverri’s 
favourite account of concepts in terms of mental representations. See for instance François Recanati, 
Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). 
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reflexive rule for ‘I’ cannot be type-individuating unless we settle on a given 
understanding of the notion of a thinker of a thought. 
As far as I can tell, this point is implicitly acknowledged in other discussions of 
the reflexive rule for ‘I’. For instance, Peacocke’s formulation of the rule looks like 
this:28 
 
AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE: ∀x ∀event of thinking ϑ: if T involves the use of 
‘I’, that use of ‘I’ refers to x just in case x is the agent of ϑ. 
 
AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE is not bare since it does feature a specific gloss on the notion 
of a thinker of a thought: the thinker is the agent of the thought. A similar sensitivity is 
reflected in the works of Campbell and Lucy O’Brien.29 
I have argued that the bare reflexive rule is unable to type-individuate the first-
person concept. As a consequence, BARE RULE ACCOUNT is untenable. In reply, 
Echeverri may either reject the contention that the reflexive rule must be type-
individuating, or try to fall back and use AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE to explain 
GUARANTEE.30 The former option strikes me as ineffective, as it is reasonable to 
																																																								
28 I slightly revise from Peacocke, The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-
Consciousness, op. cit., p. 83. 
29 Campbell, “Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Process,” op. cit., p. 623; 
Lucy O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, op. cit., p. 78. Both Campbell and O’Brien propose an agent-
based gloss on the notion of a thinker of a thought. However, while Campbell accepts that disowned 
first-person thoughts are genuine first-person thoughts, O’Brien seems to think that they are not – see 
O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, op. cit., pp. 70, 85. 
30 This fallback position has clear affinity with Echeverri’s final comments on Peacocke’s view – 
Echeverri, “Guarantee and Reflexivity,” op. cit., pp. 499-500. 
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expect that a complete reference-fixing story about ‘I’ give an answer to the question 
of what makes the first-person concept the type of concept it is.31 However, closer 
inspection reveals that the fallback option fails too. 
I.3. AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE and GUARANTEE. The canonical patterns of use of ‘I’ 
underwritten by AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE can be stated like this: 
 
Agent-based canonical patterns of use: 
 
x is the agent of the thought they are experiencing 
______________________________________ Iagent-intro 
I am x 
 
I am x 
______________________________________ Iagent-elim 
x is the agent of the thought they are experiencing 
 
Since we are considering the possibility that AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE could explain 
GUARANTEE, let us stipulate that S’s disowned first-person T exhibits GUARANTEE. 
This means that S is a coherent and competent user of ‘I’. However, given that S 
competently and rationally uses ‘I’ while denying that they are the agent of the 
thought they are experiencing, they cannot eliminate ‘I’ according to Iagent-elim. S is 
not disposed to introduce ‘I’ via Iagent-intro either, as they refuse to ascribe agent-
thinking T to themselves. That is to say, once it is granted that disowned first-person 
																																																								
31 See for instance Annalisa Coliva, “Stopping Points: ‘I’, Immunity and the Real Guarantee,” op. cit., 
p. 244; O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, op. cit., p. 57; Peacocke, Truly Understood, op. cit., p. 78ff. 
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thoughts possess GUARANTEE, the agent-based patterns of use do not adequately 
describe the possession conditions of ‘I’. We are thus faced with a dilemma: either 
AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE type-individuates ‘I’ but GUARANTEE is not a property of all 
first-person thoughts, or all first-person thoughts have GUARANTEE but they cannot 
type-individuated by AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE. This dilemma seriously undermines 
the fallback option I have sketched on behalf of Echeverri. 
 
II Explaining GUARANTEE: The Recipient Rule Account 
 
In this section I propose a way out of the dilemma by articulating a recipient-thinker 
formulation of the reflexive rule which, I contend, is able to explain GUARANTEE. 
II.1. Introducing The Recipient Rule Account. Let us consider the following 
recipient-thinker formulation of the reflexive rule:32 
 
RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE: ∀x ∀event of thinking ϑ: if ϑ involves the use of 
‘I’, that use of ‘I’ refers to x just in case x is the recipient of ϑ. 
 
The canonical patterns of use of ‘I’ underwritten by RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE can 
be stated like this: 
 
Recipient-based canonical patterns of use: 
 
x is the recipient of the thought they are experiencing 
________________________________________ Irecipient-intro 
																																																								
32  See also Michele Palmira, “Immunity, Thought Insertion, and the First-Person Concept” 
Philosophical Studies, CLXXVII, 5 (December 2021): 3833-60. 
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I am x 
 
 
I am x 
________________________________________ Irecipient-elim 
x is the recipient of they are experiencing 
 
On the face of it, a deluded S’s uses of ‘I’ are vindicated by the recipient-based 
canonical patterns of use of ‘I’. S acknowledges that T is passing through their mind 
and that it is them who are experiencing T. They report this much by using the first-
person indexical in a way that can be spelled out schematically as follows: “I am 
thinking ‘I am F’”. This is evidence that S is disposed to use ‘I’ according to Irecipient-
intro and Irecipient-elim. On these grounds, we can articulate the following explanation 
of GUARANTEE: S cannot coherently and competently question whether ‘I’ refers to 
themselves while also tokening ‘I’ because, given RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE, any 
token of ‘I’ refers to the recipient-thinker of that token of ‘I’. More precisely: 
 
RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT: A thought, T, has GUARANTEE if and only if T contains a 
token of a concept-type that is governed by RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE. 
 
To get a grip on RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT, we need to offer more details on the 
notion of a recipient-thinker of a thought. Campbell suggests that if S is the recipient-
thinker of T then it is possible for S to self-ascribe T in a direct and non-observational 
way.33 I begin to unpack this idea by noting that even when S reports a disowned T, S 
																																																								
33 Campbell, “The Ownership of Thoughts,” op. cit., p. 35. 
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attends to T and they experience it as something that they are undergoing. So, to 
experience T is to have information about the phenomenal likeness T has for S. Thus, 
the possibility of self-ascribing T ensured by being the recipient-thinker of T amounts 
to the possibility of engaging in a mental activity whereby S attends to T and gains 
information about what it is like for them to think it. Let us call this attentional mental 
activity introspecting T.34 We thus have: 
 
RECIPIENT-THINKER: X is the recipient-thinker of T if and only if, upon attending to T, 
x is introspectively aware of the phenomenal character T has for x. 
 
As a consequence, RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE reads as follows: 
 
∀x ∀event of thinking ϑ: if ϑ involves the use of ‘I’, that use of ‘I’ refers 
to x just in case x, upon attending to ϑ, is introspectively aware of the 
phenomenal character ϑ has for x. 
 
On the view on offer, then, the possibility of disowned first-person thoughts does not 
speak against GUARANTEE,35 nor does it force us to say that such thoughts are first-
personal in a derivative sense.36 Disowned first-person thoughts can be legitimately 
																																																								
34 See for instance Charles Siewart, “On the Phenomenology of Introspection,” in Declan Smithies and 
Daniel Stoljar, eds., Introspection and Consciosuness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 129-
68;  and Anna Giustina, “Introspection Without Judgment,” Erkenntnis, LXXX, 2 (April 2021): 407-27, 
for a defence of the idea that introspecting phenomenal properties requires attention. 
35 Cf. Campbell, “Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process,” op. cit., p. 
621; Peacocke, Truly Understood, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 
36 Cf. O’Brien, Self-Knowing Agents, op. cit., p. 85. 
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regarded as self-conscious thoughts, in at least the following sense: a subject S of a 
disowned first-person thought T is aware of what it is like for them to think T as they 
think it. However, S lacks action-awareness of T, and this is what explains the 
difference between deluded subjects and normal subjects: while the latter are both 
action-aware and phenomenally aware of their thoughts, the former are only 
phenomenally aware of them. 
A problem arises though. Suppose that S self-ascribes T by introspecting it, and 
the phenomenal likeness T has for S is Φ. Suppose further that, upon attending to T 
and engaging in the introspective activity, S fails to be introspectively aware of Φ.  It 
follows that S is not introspectively aware of what it is like for them to undergo T; 
hence, S fails to be the recipient of T according to RECIPIENT-THINKER. And yet, it 
seems clearly possible for S to self-ascribe T on introspective grounds. In this case, 
then, ‘I’ would not refer to me in virtue of the fact that I am introspectively aware of 
the phenomenal character of T, contra RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE. 
II.2 The epistemic basis of reflexivity. To make RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE – 
and therefore RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT – immune to this type of counterexamples, I 
submit that we should accept the following thesis: an introspective state targeting the 
phenomenal character of an occurrent thought is partly constituted by the target 
phenomenal character. This constitution thesis ensures a certain type of epistemic 
infallibility to the effect that, whenever S is introspectively aware of the phenomenal 
likeness T has for S, S is not mistaken about which phenomenal likeness T has for 
them. If we accept this view of introspection, it follows that the problematic scenario 
in which S gets the phenomenal character of T wrong but still self-ascribes T on 
introspective grounds can’t simply arise. RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE is saved, so is 
RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT. But, one may reasonably ask, at what price? 
	 17	
The constitution thesis here proposed, together with its epistemic implications, 
are of course well-known in the self-knowledge literature.37 Let me note, however, 
that they are often connected to the new acquaintance view of introspection,38 so I 
will frame my discussion by taking such view as a foil. The discussion will have to be 
brief, as I cannot offer a full discussion of introspective knowledge by acquaintance in 
the space of this note. I’ll instead try to assuage at least some of the natural worries 
one might have about harnessing such a view to defend RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT. 
To begin with, note that the new acquaintance view of introspection does not 
advocate a naively unrestricted form of infallibility according to which we are 
infallible about everything we introspect. The infallibility claim takes instead the form 
of an existential generalisation: there are just some phenomenal properties such that 
we infallibly know them by acquaintance.39 For present purposes, we can restrict the 
																																																								
37 For endorsers, see for instance David Chalmers, “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal 
Belief,” in Quentin Smith and Aleksandar Jokic, eds., Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives 
,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 220-72; Manuel García-Carpintero, “De Se Thoughts and 
Immunity to Error Through Misidentification,” op. cit., pp. 3328-9; Brie Gertler “Introspecting 
Phenomenal States,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXIII, 2 (September 2001): 305-28; 
“Renewed Acquaintance,” in Smithies and Stoljar, eds., Introspection and Consciousness, op. cit., 93-
127; Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson and G. Graham “Internal-World Skepticism and Mental Self-
Presentation,” in  Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford, eds., Self-Representational Approaches to 
Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT 2006), pp. 191-207; Terrence E. Horgan and Uriah Kriegel, 
“Phenomenal Epistemology: What Is Consciousness that We May Know It So Well?,” Philosophical 
Issues, XVII, 1 (September 2007): 123-44; Crispin Wright, “Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian 
Legacy,” in Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith and Cynthia MacDonald, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), pp. 15-45. 
38 See Gertler, “Introspecting Phenomenal States,” op. cit.,  “Renewed Acquaintance,” op. cit. 
39 See Gertler,  “Renewed Acquaintance,” op. cit. 
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scope of infallibility even further: to redeem RECIPIENT REFLEXIVE RULE it is only 
required that S have infallible introspective knowledge of the phenomenal texture of 
their occurrent thoughts only. This makes the infallibility claim I need compatible 
with the fact that we are not infallible in introspecting the complex phenomenal 
characters of some of our perceptual experiences, as witnessed by the puzzle of the 
speckled hen. Secondly, to be acquainted with the phenomenal characters of our 
thoughts in no way commits us to the highly debated thesis that thought comes with a 
distinctive phenomenal feel that cannot be reduced to sensory phenomenology. All we 
need for there to be introspective knowledge by acquaintance is the much more 
humdrum claim that there something it is like for us to have a thought passing through 
our minds. Finally, let us compare and contrast introspective knowledge by 
acquaintance of our thoughts’ phenomenal characters with self-acquaintance. As has 
already emerged in §1, Echeverri takes SELF-ACQUAINTANCE ACCOUNT to be more 
problematic than BARE RULE ACCOUNT. Echeverri offers three considerations in 
favour of this claim:40 First, BARE RULE ACCOUNT, unlike SELF-ACQUAINTANCE 
ACCOUNT, is neutral about Hume’s thesis that the self is not manifested in 
introspection. Secondly, BARE RULE ACCOUNT, unlike SELF-ACQUAINTANCE 
ACCOUNT, does not have the implication that when S thinks a first-person thought S 
has an experience that reveals the essence of things. Thirdly, being the thinker of a 
thought is an episodic relation we bear to our thoughts as we are thinking them, but 
self-acquaintance is a relation we always bear to ourselves. 
Fortunately, however, RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT retains these advantages over 
SELF-ACQUAINTANCE ACCOUNT despite being committed to an acquaintance view of 
introspection. The first point to note is that the kind of introspective knowledge by 
																																																								
40 Echeverri, “Guarantee and Reflexivity”, op. cit., p. 487 fn. 23. 
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acquaintance I appeal to is compatible with Hume’s elusiveness of the self thesis, for 
the idea is that I’m only acquainted with the phenomenal texture my thoughts have for 
me and not with myself. Secondly, being acquainted with the phenomenal character 
of my thoughts does not imply that I’m acquainted with the essence or the nature of 
those thoughts, unless one also assumes the thesis that a thought’s phenomenal 
character somehow constitutes its essence or nature. This additional assumption, 
however, is not part of RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT. Thirdly, I take introspective 
knowledge by acquaintance to require attending to the phenomenal character of T. For 
this reason, we must keep it distinct from the sort of peripheral awareness of our 
conscious states we (allegedly) have whenever we are conscious.41 Thus, being 
acquainted with the phenomenal character T has for me, just like thinking T, is an 
episodic relation I bear to T. 
This shows that RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT is not saddled with the problems that 
affect SELF-ACQUAINTANCE ACCOUNT. I thus conclude that RECIPIENT RULE 





Echeverri fails to accomplish his primary aim, namely to explain GUARANTEE via 
BARE RULE ACCOUNT. GUARANTEE can’t be explained by AGENT REFLEXIVE RULE 
either. If we aim to explain GUARANTEE by appealing to the reflexive rule for ‘I’, we 
must understand the notion of a thinker of a thought that features the rule in the 
																																																								
41 For an articulation and defence of the notion of peripheral awareness, see Uriah Kriegel, Subjective 
Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009): chapter V. 
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recipiency sense, where S is the recipient of a thought T just in case, when S attends 
to T, S obtains infallible introspective knowledge by acquaintance of the phenomenal 
character T has for them. This makes the rule account of GUARANTEE I end up 
proposing, RECIPIENT RULE ACCOUNT, epistemically loaded and I think ultimately 
tenable albeit controversial. 
Be that as it may, I do suspect that if the first-person concept really is special it 
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